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STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The Utah Supreme Couit !„!:; held that, "Trial Courts are given primary 
responsibility for making determinations of fact. Findings of tact are reviewed by 
find clear error, it must decide that the factual findings made by ..._ .rial court are not 
adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light 
mo' TavoraD ... > Inal CUUII'L., delernunction " State ul Utah v. Pena, HW I' I'd 
go 
The appellate court's standard of review with regard to issues of law are, "that 
all applications of law ••• nndings of fact that produce UHIUU.'JIUIIIJ HI Mw ,iu. 
reviewed uridyl ,i tu didod i e-nt i. d r.l;--indanl, M I<M r,rnrectness." State v. Ramirez. 
817 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Utah 1991). 
In reviewing marshaled evidence, "the appellate court standard ol leview 
iiM|iiin ", [IK itppelldlL-1 i.uinl li i ih'h i lii llii I I M I i mil l i i i i i lqni i ' i i l mil in il l<"> i ) 
it so long as the Court finds that the trial court has exercised its discretion in 
5 
accordance with the standards set by this state's appellate courts." Rudman v. 
Rudman. 812 P.2d 73, 79, (Utah App. 1991). 
If the appellate court does not have marshaled evidence, "there is no reason 
to disturb the trial court's findings." Ashtonv.Ashton. 733 P.2d 147,150(Utah 1987). 
Most important for the purposes of this appeal, the Utah Supreme Court outlined in 
very detailed fashion in Chen v. Stewart 100 P.3d 1177(Utah 2004), "In order to 
challenge a Court's factual findings, an appellant must first marshal all of the 
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the findings even when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the Court below." 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(9): . . .a party challenging a 
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the 
request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Court of Appeals should dismiss this appeal due to the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Order supporting the trial record of the several 
6 
contempts entered against the Respondent as well as the Courts' assessment of 
attorney fees. 
Appellant's lack of marshaling I he evidence w.jn.ml llm, nutlet's suiiiiii.ny 
dismissal pinsiinnl In well established caselaw. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS/NATURE OF THE CASE 
The parties divorced in April, 1999 (Record @ 54). Petitioner filed a Petition 
ti i Mi ii III ' in I I in 11 .Mil)'i (I ,i't mil di'i h I I I "i'III n mi I III i 11 in i >nli I In Sin i' i HIM 
and a hearing was held on April 4, 2005 (Record @ 85). Petitioner filed a second 
Order to Show Cause in September, 2006 (Record @ 167). 
At a hearing heiu _ _ L J I M 
Kouris to handle the respective Petitions to Modify and the second Order to Show 
Cause (Record @ 169) and Respondent was ordered to produce tax records 
showing his gross receipts for the past several years. 
/'Hi'i i 11 ill 11 11 hi il In 'hi i in Ni loiter °fi '>0()(> II II CHI ill i nloierl respective 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and an Order. Respondent appealed the 
Findings and Order entered by the Court, Case No. 20070176, and the Utah Court 
of Appeals upheld nil nt Ihr I ri.it ( ourl1'. ImdirKj1; Willi llm exr.eplinir; llinl Ihc 111. il 
Court's award of attorney fees to the Petitioner was remanded back to the Trial Court 
7 
for additional findings. Further, the Court of Appeals found that the Trial Court 
exceeded its discretion by allowing a letter to be submitted into evidence that was 
part of settlement negotiations, but the Utah Court of Appeals also found that the 
error was harmless. 
ARGUMENT: POINT ONE 
WAS THE TRIAL COURT JUSTIFIED IN ITS FINDINGS AND ORDER OF 
SEVERAL CONTEMPTS AGAINST THE RESPONDENT? 
"The decision to hold a party in contempt of court rests within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court's 
action is so unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear 
abuse of discretion." Marsh v. Marsh. 1999 UT App 14, 973 P.2d 988 (Utah App. 
1999) (quoting Bartholomew v. Bartholomew. 548 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah 1976)). 
"Under Utah law, in order to prove contempt for failure to comply with a 'Court 
order it must be shown that the person cited for contempt knew what was required, 
had the ability to comply, and intentionally failed or refused to do so.'" Homever v. 
Staqq & Assocs.. 2006 UT App 89, 132 P.3d 684 (quoting Von Hake v. Thomas. 
759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988). 
8 
The Trial Court found that there had been non-compliance by Respondent of 
a previous Court order (Record @ 395 and 396). Specifically, paragraph three of 
the Decree of Divorce states in part that,... "The parties shall work together to 
resolve issues involving the children..." (Record @ 53). The Trial Court specifically 
found that... "Respondent was aware of the Decree and certainly had the capacity 
to follow the Decree" (Record @ 396). The Court further found that, "Respondent's 
actions of calling a family meeting with the children was deplorable for involving the 
children of the parties" (Record @ 396). 
Petitioner states that a Court order mandating that the parties work together 
regarding issues involving the children is the same as giving the parties instructions 
that they will not work against one another when dealing with children issues. This 
is not to go as far as to say that the parties must be in agreement with each other. 
The parties may have genuine disagreements, but the operative words that the 
parties "will work together to resolve issues involving the children" means that they 
will literallyworktogetherwhen dealing with parenting issues. Of course, the actions 
of the Respondent of calling a family meeting without Petitioner being involved and 
telling the children: 
9 
1. due to the actions (recent Court litigation) of your Mother the Court 
has said that I have not paid your Mother a lot of money; 
2. they needed to forgive their mother for the actions she had taken 
against Respondent; 
3. because of your Mom I can't buy you a big Christmas any more and 
I can't take you on vacations and trips any more (Record @ 396). 
Respondent would have the Court believe that the Trial Court and Petitioner 
argue that there is something inherently wrong with holding a family meeting. Of 
course, that is not the case. Respondent is free to hold daily family meetings to 
discuss plans and activities of whatever nature Respondent so desires. However, 
Respondent is not free to hold family meetings with the children to explain 
Respondent's problems with Petitioner or to berate the children's mother and to try 
and inform the children that due to actions of the children's mother, the children will 
be directly impacted in a huge way. 
In fact, Petitioner's testimony at the hearing was that the reaction of the 
children immediately after the family meeting, when returning to Petitioner, was that 
they were extremely upset and began taking their anger and frustration out on 
Petitioner. That is why the Trial Court made very specific findings of fact that 
10 
Respondent's actions "were deplorable" (Record at 396). Additionally, the Trial 
Court stated in its findings that the Court was "upset that the Respondent told the 
children to forgive their Mother" (Record @ 395). 
Further, Respondent's appeal brief defends Respondent's action by stating 
that, "the Court does not necessarily police such actions" (Page 20, third full 
paragraph). Respondent also claims in the same paragraph that, "An act that may 
not be mannerly or inappropriate in a general social setting does not become 
contempt because a divorced party is involved" (Respondent's brief at page 20, 
paragraph 3). 
The second separate contempt found by the Trial Court involved two separate 
child support checks from Respondent that had the letter "B" and "B!" handwritten in 
the lower left hand corner of each of the checks in the "Memo" or "For" section of the 
check. Petitioner submitted copies of the checks in her Affidavit in Support of Order 
to Show Cause (Record @ 236 and 237 and Appendix A). Respondent testified that 
he did not personally write either of these checks, but that his current wife wrote out 
both checks. However, Respondent did testify that he was aware of the checks and 
the second check he personally saw what was written on the check and that he 
11 
personally hand delivered the check to one of the minor children to have the child 
give the check to Petitioner. 
Once again, Respondent tries to down-play and defend his actions claiming 
that, "consider the same checks being delivered to a landlord or a creditor. This 
action would not be illegal" (Brief at page 20). Not only is Respondent's argument 
or justification wrong (individuals have been prosecuted to the full extent of the law 
for writing denigrating language on their checks in traffic citation cases and others) 
but in both situations of writing denigrating language on checks and in calling family 
meetings to discuss what the children's mother has done, the Respondent is putting 
the minor children in the middle of the divorce and is telling the children what 
Respondent thinks of their Mother. This flies in the face of the Court order that the 
parents shall work together for the welfare of the children. This has a literal 
poisoning effect upon the children and even reaches issues of abuse and self worth 
problems for the children to grapple with. 
Taken literally, Respondent would have this Court believe that the only way 
that Respondent could be found to be in contempt of Court for non-compliance is if 
the language in the Decree prohibited the writing of denigrating language on checks 
written by Respondent. Likewise, the argument on the other contempt finding would 
12 
be that the Court could only find contempt if the Court order prohibited any family 
meetings. Respondent has not understood Petitioner's position that family meetings 
are fine, just not family meetings that discuss what the mother of the children has 
done that is wrong and how the children are going to be impacted. 
Finally, the Court must consider the cumulative effect that must have been the 
mindset of the Trial Court as the evidence unfolded. Less than six months earlier, 
October 26, 2006 the Court had held a trial between these exact same parties 
regarding different issues. The Court had entered findings (Record @ 210-213) for 
contempt against Respondent for: 
1. failing to pay the proper amount of child support to Petitioner; 
2. failing to pay the proper amount of alimony to Petitioner; 
3. failing to produce his tax records; and, 
4. failing to pay the necessary non-school extra curricular activities of 
the children. 
Further, the Court had found that Respondent was not credible in his testimony 
and that Petitioner was credible in her trial testimony (Record @ 212). 
The cumulative effect of Respondent not complying with numerous Court 
orders in the October 26,2006 trial and then the Trial Court finding that Respondent 
13 
was engaging in additional actions that the Court found to be contemptible is best 
described by the Court itself at the close of trial on October 26,2006 wherein Judge 
Kouris specifically told Respondent, "I'm ordering Mr. Thompson to understand that 
today in this courtroom you've been found in contempt of Court. There's a couple 
of things that judges can do when people are found in contempt, most notably, they 
can put them in jail for a month or they can fine them up to a thousand 
dollars....Based on the fact that you knew what all of these requirements are, I 
expect you to follow through with them now...the next time that you are found in 
contempt of my Court, I will consider seriously jail time (Record @ 352 Trial 
transcript, page 158). Finally, it is important to note that the findings of contempt by 
the Trial Court were recently upheld by the Utah Court of Appeals in Case No. 
20070176CA in a decision recently rendered on January 4, 2008. 
ARGUMENT: POINT TWO 
DID RESPONDENT PROPERLY MARSHAL ALL OF THE EVIDENCE AS IS 
MANDATED BY THE RULES AND THE COURT IN CHEN v. STEWART. 2004 UT 
82, 100 P.3D 1177? 
Petitioner has already listed under her Standards of Review section of this 
brief the problems that are evident due to Respondent's refusal to marshal the 
14 
evidence as is outlined in Chen. Further, Petitioner has set forth the determinative 
rule found in the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(9). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Chen not only found that Defendant's had failed 
to marshal evidence, the Court also handed down specific "requirements" that 
Respondent must meet. An in depth analysis of these requirements brings to light 
the serious deficiencies in Respondent's brief. As is stated in Chen. "In order to 
challenge a Court's factual findings an appellant must first marshal all the evidence 
in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient 
to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to a Court 
below" (quoting Wilson Supply. Inc. v. Fraden Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, 54 P.3d 
1177). The Court admitted in Chen that the requirements to properly marshal were 
both rigorous and strict. 
The first two issues identified by Respondent in his brief include whether the 
Trial Court committed reversible error in finding the Respondent in contempt of 
Court. At page ten of Respondent's brief he claims just after the Summary heading 
that, "The facts as marshaled to support the District Court's findings are stated 
below." Respondent then takes the next three pages of his brief to outline his 
marshaled facts. The first two pages of Respondent's attempt to marshal are totally 
15 
irrelevant to the very issues that Respondent raised in the appeal with the exception 
that he could argue that the attorney fee issue is impacted. Page twelve and thirteen 
under the headings of Family Meeting and Checks with "B!" are the only attempts 
that Respondent makes to marshal the facts. 
There are precisely seventeen references to the record that Respondent 
identifies in his brief on the two issues regarding contempt. The Utah Supreme 
Court elaborated in Chen that more recently the Utah Court of Appeals explained 
that, "In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very finding that appellant 
resists" (quoting Neelv v. Bennett. 2002 UT App 189, 51 P.3d 724). 
The Court in Chen gave additional direction to appellants by stating, "This 
does not mean that the party may simply provide an exhaustive review of all 
evidence presented at trial. Rather, appellants must provide a precisely focused 
summary of all the evidence supporting the findings they challenge. This summary 
must correlate all particular items of evidence with the challenged findings and then 
convince us that the Trial Court erred in the assessment of that evidence to its 
findings "(quoting W. Valley City v. Majestic Inv.. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct. 
16 
App. 1991)). "What appellants cannot do is re-argue the factual case they presented 
in the Trial Court" (quoting Ondera/SLIC v. Ondera Cold Storage & Warehouse Inc., 
872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah Ct App. 1994). 
In its findings the Trial Court outlined the facts that it relied on to enter the 
findings of contempt of Court against the Respondent. This included the following 
facts that were not addressed by the Respondent: 
1. the Decree states that the parties shall work together to solve issues 
involving the children; 
2. the children are not to be involved; 
3. the Respondent had several options available to involve the children; 
4. the Respondent was significantly behind in his child support; 
5. Respondent told the children to forgive their mother; and, 
6. the second check with denigrating language was personally handed 
by Respondent to the parties' oldest child (who was 16 years old). 
Additionally, the Court in Chen stated, "to properly marshal the evidence the 
challenging party must demonstrate how the Court found the facts from the evidence 
and then explain why those findings contradict the clear weight of evidence" (citing 
Ondera at 1054). 
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Here, the Trial Court's findings were clearly supported by the evidence. As 
in Chen, Respondent has merely ignored damaging findings and avoided confronting 
problematic facts. 
Hence, with Respondent not properly marshaling the evidence, the facts as 
found by the Trial Court stand and the rulings of contempt are proper or as the Court 
stated in Chen, "if the marshaling requirement is not met, the Appellate Court has 
grounds to affirm the Court's findings on that basis alone" (quoting Wilson). 
ARGUMENT: POINT THREE 
DID RESPONDENT CITE AND APPLY THE CORRECT AND PROPER 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN HIS BRIEF? 
In the first two issues as set forth by Respondent in his "Statement of Issues" 
he claims that the Standard of Review for contempt cases is clear and convincing 
evidence. This claim actually pertains to the burden of proof and not the standard 
of review. The standard of review for a civil contempt finding that is being 
challenged is that of "clear abuse of discretion" or are the Trial Court's actions so 
unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary. Marsh v. Marsh. 1999 
UT App 14, 973 P.2d 988 (quoting Bartholomew v. Bartholomew. 548 P.2d 238,240 
(Utah 1976). 
18 
The last two issues raised by Respondent in his appeal deal with attorney 
fees. Respondent claims that the standard of review for attorney fees in divorce 
cases involves the interpretation of a divorce decree as set forth in Hawkins v. Peart. 
2000 Utah 94, 37 P.3d 1062 (Utah 2001). Hawkins is a personal injury contract 
indemnity case. The Court held in Hawkins that, "the Supreme Court reviews the 
lower Court's contractual interpretation of a release form for correctness, affording 
the District Court no deference." 
Petitioner sets forth that the standard of review in relation to attorney fees has 
nothing to do with a contractual interpretation. If Respondent argues that a divorce 
decree is a contract, Petitioner counters that that is incorrect. A marriage may be 
an enforceable contract between two individuals but the resulting Decree of Divorce 
is not a contract, it is an order of the Court. 
Since Respondent has not given the Court of Appeals adequate or correct 
standards of review, and since there has not been adequate marshaling of the facts, 
Respondent's appeal must fail. 
19 
ARGUMENT: POINT FOUR 
HAS RESPONDENT PROPERLY REQUESTED AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF IN THE 
ARGUMENT SECTION OF HIS APPEAL BRIEF, POINT SIX, WITHOUT RAISING 
OR IDENTIFYING THE REQUEST IN HIS STATEMENT OF ISSUES? 
It is not until argument six of Respondent's brief that Respondent claims that 
the Court erred in not ordering a refund of the overpaid child support in the amount 
of $455.08. Throughout the brief Respondent claims that he prevailed on the 
controlling issue of the Order to Show Cause hearing (page 27, second full 
paragraph). In fact, this was only one of several issues with a focus by Petitioner on 
the improper family meeting and denigrating checks that were being received by 
Petitioner from the Respondent. 
Respondent should not be allowed to argue that he receive a refund since it 
was not properly reserved nor was it properly raised in the brief. The Trial Court was 
fully aware of this overpayment yet choose not to order Petitioner to refund it nor 
give Respondent credit probably due to the multitude of contempts found by the 
Court and the fact that Respondent still owed Petitioner over $50,000.00 that had yet 
to be paid. 
Petitioner requests that the Court deny this improper request. 
20 
ARGUMENT: POINT FIVE 
WAS IT PROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO AWARD PETITIONER HER 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS AND DENY RESPONDENT HIS ATTORNEY 
FEES? 
The Trial Court found that Petitioner was ultimately victorious in her motion in 
terms of the contempt. Therefore, her attorney fees and costs were granted (R@ 
395). 
Respondent argues that no attorney fees should be allowed even though the 
Decree sets forth an award of fees against a party if they are found in contempt 
(Record @46). The Trial Court did not base the award of attorney fees on this 
provision in the Decree, but on the fact that Petitioner had prevailed and Respondent 
had yet again been found to have demonstrated contemptuous behavior regarding 
the orders of the Court. 
Further, Respondent argues that he prevailed on the controlling issue of the 
hearing, this being whether child support should be raised. Even though the Court 
did not enter another contempt of Court against Respondent on this issue, the Court 
found that Respondent's actions were upsetting and Respondent's behavior was 
deplorable and therefore awarded Petitioner all of her attorney fees and costs. 
21 
ARGUMENT: POINT SIX 
PETITIONER SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COURT COSTS ON APPEAL 
The Utah Court of Appeals noted in Wells v. Wells. 871 P.2d 1036, 1038 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) that, "An award of attorney fees in divorce actions rests within 
the sound discretion of the trial court, which we will not disturb absent an abuse of 
discretion." Additionally, the court stated in Childs v. Childs. 967 P.2d 942, 947 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) that, "in divorce proceedings when a trial court has awarded 
attorney fees below to the party who then prevails on the main issues on appeal, we 
generally award fees on appeal." Petitioner requests that her attorney fees and court 
costs be awarded for the necessity of responding to Respondent's appeal and that 
a judgment enter against the Respondent. 
CONCLUSION 
Clearly the Trial Court had an abundant record to determine those issues 
outlined in Respondent's brief and Petitioner's response. The Trial Court carefully 
weighed the evidence with respect to each of the issues and considered the 
testimony of the witnesses at the hearing. Finally, because Respondent did not 
marshal the evidence and has not properly identified the Standards of Review, 
22 
Respondent's appeal should be denied and the Trial Court's ruling should be 
affirmed. Petitioner should be awarded attorney fees on appeal. 
DATED THIS ^ day of January, 2008 
^Q 
David J Friel 
Attorney for Appellee 
f-o. 
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